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Introduction and statement of the problem
Opinion research and politics are having equal diffi­
culties in conceptually grasping the Greens' latest 
election success. What for some represents the result 
of a long-term change in values is for others merely 
spontaneous protest against a political system alleged 
to have become inflexible. There is similar variety in 
the presumed consequences of the party political form­
ation of Green voter potential. Are these the first 
signs of a basic realignment between social groups and 
the party system, or will the "protest potential" be 
absorbed by the established party system? A cursory 
glance at the distribution of opinion in the popula­
tion makes the second alternative look unlikely. Large 
parts of the population welcome the foundation of an 
environment party and would even vote for it in some 
circumstances. Estimates vary as to the level of voter 
potential from which the Greens could win votes'*". How­
ever, the trend is plain: from an originally rather 
amorphous group of spontaneous sympathizers, a hard 
core of voters that can be counted towards the voter 
potential of an environment party is clearly crystal­
lizing out. In early summer 1980, on our estimate, the 
upper limit of this potential was some 15% of those 
entitled to vote.
It would be unrealistic to assume, on the strength of 





























































































election simulations and forecasts, that the Greens 
will be able to exploit this voter potential to any 
great extent at present. On the other hand, a number 
of individual results in the latest Landtag and es­
pecially municipal elections indicate that the share 
of voters accessible to the Greens is in particular 
conditions well above that in the 1980 Bundestag 
elections. For instance, where threats to the environ­
ment arise, or have already occurred, large movements 
away from the established parties towards the Greens 
are unleashed. An intuitive interpretation of the 
election results, namely to see this pattern as a 
causal connection, is tempting. However, this is in­
sufficient. It can be shown —  as is the aim of this 
paper —  that the connection between the perceived de­
terioration in the performance of the party and 
government system (for instance in the form of un­
solved environment problems) and voting for the Greens 
can essentially be explained indirectly: acute politi­
cal conflicts about differing strategies for solving 
environment problems will lead to voting for an en­
vironment party (or another "new" party) when they im­
pinge on politically weakly-mediated interests. In 
this view, the quality of the ties that potential 
"Green" voters have to the existing parties and to the 






























































































There have been various approaches towards explaining 
the causal connections of decreasing ties, and they 
are rather hard to distinguish analytically. Firstly, 
the social structure approach has recourse to the 
pattern of social stratification, its development in 
the context of social change and the consequences for 
changes in political views. Secondly, the value shift 
hypothesis, while starting essentially from the same 
situation, stresses primarily the effect of changed 
value priorities, the New Politics, as a cause of 
weakened ties to the political system. Finally, the 
protest thesis singles out disturbed relationships be­
tween "elite" and "masses" as a cause of the declining 
loyalty of social groups. One of the results of this 
analysis is that while each of these approaches makes 
its own contribution towards explaining the causes of 
weakening ties to the political system, it is only by 
combining all the proposed explanations that the 
dimensions of the new conflict can be adequately illu­
minated. A reduction of the problem to the alternative 
of value shift or protest does not seem indicated. In­
stead, the development described can be seen as a 
"three-stage process": change in social structure-* 
change in political value concepts -» change in electo­






























































































The present analysis is based on a series of popula­
tion surveys carried out by Rudolf Wildenmann, of 
Mannheim University and the European University Insti­
tute, Florence, in collaboration with W.E. Wright, 
Silke Wollweber and the author between 1976 and 1980. 
The surveys are representative of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and were carried out in early summer of 
1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980. The field work was 
done by Infratest, Munich. The data sets will soon be 
available through the Central Archives in Cologne. For 
the analysis of the shift towards the "New Politics", 
here given only very briefly, it was possible to refer 
back to the Cologne/Mannheim election studies of 1961, 
1969 and 1972; these data are available from the Cen­
tral Archives as part of the "German Electoral Data 
Project".
Social differentiation and decreasing social control
The development of modern industrial states into wel­
fare states of the post-industrial type (Bell 1963, 
Huntington 1974), the rise of new forms of political 
participation (Barnes/Kaase et al 1979), and the pro­
cess of the formation of social vehicles for new 
political ideas —  such as the Greens or other altern­





























































































Social modernization, with its manifold accompaniments 
such as urbanization, industrialization, the decline 
of traditional value orientations, social democrati­
zation, educational expansion and increasing spatial 
and social mobility (Huntington 1974: 32, Flanagan 
1979) lays, as it were, the foundation on which a re­
arrangement between party systems and social structure 
can be built.
In this process considerable, if not decisive, import­
ance is ascribed to the state of development of the 
social mode of production (cf. Kornhauser 1959, Jano- 
witz 1970, 1976). Modern industrial societies are so­
cieties with a high degree of division of labour. This 
fine-grain division of labour has led and is leading 
to a many-layered social differentiation and, through 
the rising degree of organization of socio-economic 
interests, to progressive differentiation of the 
social stratification structure. In this process, old 
class contradictions are increasingly broken down, 
while the differentiation within social strata by 
sectoral and regional subdivision increases further.
At the same time, the heightened spatial and social 
mobility of many members of society promotes the form­
ation of heterogeneous social environments (Daalder 
1967, Giddens 1975). In the course of this development 





























































































made homogeneous by the social structure, and the re­
levance of belonging to associations and social groups 
through which value and attitude patterns are struc­
tured, diminish.
Decreasing social control over individual political de­
cisions through strong social-structural ties makes 
room for heterogeneous influence through differing and 
fluctuating social relationships and interests 
(Janowitz 1976: 85ff, Kornhauser 1959). For the poli­
tical sphere, this concatenation is connected with de­
clining party loyalties, stronger issue orientation by 
voters and decreasing class voting behaviour (Pappi 
1973, Klingemann 1973, Lipset 1981).
Hand in hand with the progressive differentiation of 
the social division of labour goes the decreasing im­
portance of traditional legitimation contexts in 
modern welfare states and the considerably increased 
level of education and information of broad areas of 
the population.
In the social sphere, this "educational revolution" 
(Allardt 1968: 73) leads to a situation where the 
difference between the intellectual capacities and po­





























































































part of the younger population and on the other of the 
ruling political and social elite becomes less and 
less. At the same time, with the increasing complexity 
of political decisions, the distance between the two 
groups as regards the chances of real influence over 
the political process increases. This situation fa­
vours politicization as a symbol of social problems 
that in the broadest sense have to do with increasing 
the chances of political participation. The continued 
non-fulfilment of these demands can in the end lead to 
the establishment of new social conflict, in conse­
quence of which attitudes towards political authority 
—  towards politicians and the institutionally an­
chored standards that regulate entry to ruling posi­
tions in society —  change radically.
For the chances specifically for an environment party 
to become a relevant factor in the political system, 
given this background, two further accompaniments of 
the socio-economic development of modern industrial 
society are of importance —  the level of prosperity 
and its costs to the public (Lehner 1979b).
Prosperity and its costs
According to Ronald Inglehart's much-discussed theory 
(1971, 1977) the raising of material prosperity 





























































































post-industrial, societies in favour of the satis­
faction of non-material interests. In his view the 
shift in priority of needs results above all from the 
high prosperity of these societies, which has led to 
the large-scale satisfaction of the material needs of 
many members of society. To the extent that material 
needs are individually satisfied and the marginal be­
nefit from any further rise in the level of provision 
becomes less, the satisfaction of non-material needs 
gains in importance: there is a shift in individual 
hierarchies of needs from material to non-material 
interests.
Without distinguishing here whether this is a case of 
a lastingly stable socialization process of post-ma­
terialist value structures or rather of merely tempo-
2rary and reversible shifts , we can state that such a 
shift in priorities in favour of non-material interests 
increases the chances of parties with a corresponding 
programme.
The election results in the "strongholds" of the Greens 
indicate that the explanatory power of this approach 
increases when not only the prosperity of western in­
dustrial societies and its consequence for the popula­





























































































also the costs of this prosperity and its effect on 
individual need priorities (Lehner 1979b). The nature 
and extent of these costs of prosperity, that arise as 
a "by-product" of an economy devoted to growth, are 
perceived by many citizens as steadily on the increase. 
To the extent that these costs of prosperity —  from 
environment pollution to the fear of radiation from 
nuclear power stations —  rise in relation to the in­
dividually reached level of prosperity, the need to 
reduce these costs increases. Demands to correct these 
developments are increasingly articulated and —  if
the logic of competitive democracy is followed —  ag-
3gregated via the party system . This form of conflict 
resolution functions as long as the demands for cor­
rections do not touch the fundamental structures of 
the social mode of production. At that point the es­
tablished parties can no longer resolve the conflict 
structurally, since they themselves, via the tradition­
al legitimation pattern of "growth as a basis for 
rising individual prosperity" (Murphy et al. 1979: 157) 
become protagonists in the conflict. At the same time, 
these demands are hard to implement in the context of 
large interest groups with a primarily economic 
orientation —  from employers' associations to trade 
unions —  because of their low capacity for organiza­





























































































vironmentalists and the materially saturated pop­
ulation groups not mediated in the "old" class con­
flict dimensions, this means that yet another non­
material need is no longer being adequately met, name­
ly their participation whether actual or psychologi­
cally mediated through party links, in political de­
cisions. Theoretically there then opens up before 
these groups a new dimension of political conflict, 
structured by political problems that can no longer be 
defined through the mainly materially based industrial 
class conflict —  the "old" politics —  but stand out­
side this conflict and the groups that mediate it.
From the point of view of ideas this means that dif­
fering standpoints on the political problems are no 
longer, as assumed by Downs (1957), reflected in a 
change in the individual position on a one-dimensional 
political scale —  let us say left-right or liberal- 
conservative —  but lead to the development of a "new" 
political dimension perpendicular thereto.
The "New Politics": Establishment v. Anti-Establishment
The hypothesis that a party system constitutes in a 
voter's perception a multidimensional structure of de­
cision alternatives is not new. It was presented as a 
reformulation of Down's model by Stokes (1966),





























































































Barnes/Kaase et al. (1979). What is new is the view 
that the party systems of post-industrial societies 
can best be seen as a two-dimensional space consti­
tuted by an old and a new politics dimension (Barnes/ 
Kaase 1979, Hildebrandt/Dalton 1977, Dalton 1978).
The new conflict dimension has in common with the old 
"left-right" dichotomy the fact that, in both, poli­
tical forces oriented towards change are set against a 
conservative political camp. In this original sense, 
the new conflict situation could certainly be under­
stood as left-right conflict. On the other hand, the 
two dimensions are distinguished by the different re­
lationship to the opposition in the conflict. While 
the old left-right dimension separates the "haves" 
from the "have-nots", and the conflict relates to the 
extent of political intervention in social development, 
the new political dimension sets the forces that in­
sist on conventional mediation of interest, the es­
tablishment, against the groups not yet incorporated 
in the system who favour unconventional strategies for 
acquiring social power. In this sense the two axes of 
the party system can be treated as the value dimension 
and standards dimension of social conflicts (Klinge- 
mann/Pappi 1972:3), with the value axis distinguishing 
the value communities linked to the traditional con­





























































































goal orientation") and the standards axis distinguish­
ing groups with differing strengths of social ties and 
consequent differing acceptance levels of traditional 
forms of participation. The characterization of the 
two camps as "establishment" and "anti-establishment" 
should in substance be seen in this sense. The ideally 
typical "new left" position, as located in this party 
space, differs in this account from the old left 
position not necessarily in terms of programmatic goals, 
but rather in terms of those goals' organisational me­
diation, which had been previously brought about con­
ventionally through the interest groups appropriate to 
the reideologized class conflict. Without venturing 
further into the range of problems raised by this, we 
might, in this classification, characterize the politi­
cal camp of the "new right" as that which combines con­
servative and traditionalist goal orientation with low 
social bonding and preference for unconventional forms 
of participation.
(FIGURE 1)
If these theoretical deductions have validity for the 
German party system, empirical analysis should reveal 
three things. Firstly, that in voters' perception 





























































































guished analytically from the traditional conflict 
structure. Secondly, that the established parties can 
offer no, or only inadequate, policy options along 
this dimension. Finally, that the political left in 
the Federal Republic sees itself as split into two 
camps, with the old left tending towards the SPD and 
the new left more towards the alternative, Green camp. 
These connections will be discussed below.
The New Politics dimension
In recent political science literature there has been 
a number of approaches and methods for operationally 
encompassing the existence of a New Politics dimen­
sion. Miller and Levitin (1976) define their "New 
politics groups" through individual attitudes towards 
political protest, law and order, the social counter­
culture and the governmental control apparatus. Hilde- 
brandt and Dalton (1977) operationalized their "new 
politics dimension", as Inglehardt (1971, 1977) did 
his post-materialism index, through the personal im­
portance of political problems. Finally, Kaase and 
Klingemann (1979) and Barnes/Kaase et al. (1979) cal­
culate their protest, or establishment/anti-establish- 
ment, dimension on the basis of sympathy ratings of 





























































































common to these concepts is that they attempt to under­
stand party systems not as a purely interpretative 
quantity, but as a space model, which constitutes as 
faithful a representation as possible of the voter's 
psychological closeness to the parties and of the dis­
tances between those parties deduced therefrom.
In the analysis presented here, the "Old v. New Poli­
tics" dimension is developed on the basis of sympathy 
ratings of only four parties —  the CDU, SPD, FDP and 
Greens. The restriction to these parties ensures that 
the resulting "New Politics dimension" is defined only 
on the basis of support for the Greens in relation to 
the established parties^. If despite this restriction 
the term "New Politics dimension" is nevertheless used, 
this is because the following analysis and the compar­
ison with the data of the Political Action Study 1980 
tend to support the substance of this interpretation 
(cf. Dalton 1981, also Kaase/Klingemann 1979).
(TABLE 1)
The low rating of the Greens is noteworthy; not only 
did an above average number of those surveyed find 
themselves unable to make any judgement of the Greens 
(7.8%), but in addition, the most frequent evaluation 






























































































To determine the parties' position vis-à-vis one 
another, a principal components analysis was carried 
out on the basis of the sympathy ratings, having 
sifted the individual answer patterns6. This analysis, 
as expected, separated the Old Politics factor (eigen­
value 1.99) from an analytically clearly profiled New 
Politics factor (1.33) and a third factor determined 
mainly by the position of the FDP, which because of 
the small eigenvalue (0.68) will not be included in 
further analysis. The variance share of the factors 
expressed in the eigenvalue (50 and 33%) expresses 
first of all the still dominant explanatory power of 
the polarization between old blocs of power and in­
fluence, in which the dispute along the traditional 
lines of conflict is reflected. Besides this the 
second factor, running perpendicularly to the first, 
points to the existence of a marked potential basis 
for a political re-orientation of the German party 
system. Figure 3 shows diagrammatically the 1980 model 
of the German party system as deduced from this ana­
lysis. A notable feature is the rather indifferent 
position of the Greens as regards the Old Politics 
dimension: in the voters' view they have, indeed, a 
slightly conservative goal orientation.





























































































From the position in this space of the voter groups
defined by older conflicts of status and religion, it
becomes clear how small the explanatory value of
traditional conflict and stratification patterns is
7for the New Politics dimension . On the Old Politics 
dimension, as against this, the trend to a further 
diminution of religion and class conflict can, com­
paring the configuration with say the findings of the 
analysis by Pappi (1973) or Dalton (1981), be seen to 
be continuing. Nevertheless —  leaving aside the small 
group of landowners -- the Old Politics dimension re­
mains the most important conflict dimension for the 
groups defined by affilliation to traditionally me­
diated social-structure relationships. This finding is 
fully in line with expectations, since after all the 
historical process of political transformation of the 
central conflict positions has made the party political 
embodiment of these core groups of the social structure 
a dominant characteristic of party systems, not only in 
Germany. The continuing politicization, i.e. political 
interpretation, of these conflicts by the parties them­
selves (Daalder 1966, Sartori 1968, Pappi 1988), as 
well as the reinforcement of these conflict constel­





























































































pite the far-reaching opening up of the major parties 
—  the trend towards the "people's party" —  to the 
maintenance of this pattern. However, for reasons 
given above, there is doubt that one can deduce from 
this the persistence of the party system suspected by 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967). To the extent that the 
voters separate their party preference from their 
social-structure ties and take their voting decisions 
instead on the basis of perceived issue competence, 
candidate preferences or their ideologically struc­
tured world-view, the success of social-structure 
transformation processes on the Old Politics deminsion 
will decline. At the same time there will be an in­
crease in the political room for manoeuvre of pro­
cesses of rearrangement between social structure and 
party system, in a manner similar to the emergence of 
the new lines of social conflict sketched out above.
From the theoretical deduction of the causes of 
weakening links to the political system, it may be 
concluded that, apart from the general rise in the 
level of education, it is above all membership in dif­
ferent generational units that constitutes the relativi- 
zation of the mapping between social structure and 
politics. This presumption of a generational effect is 





























































































versally accepted in research on political socializa­
tion, that primary political socialization takes place 
at the age of between 14 and 18. The political pheno­
mena and social contexts with which young poeple are 
confronted at that age take on dominant importance, on 
this view, for the formation of their general and 
political concepts of values and standards. To deter­
mine the influences that generation effects have on 
political orientation, it is not enough to bring to­
gether several birth years into age cohorts at roughly 
equal time intervals, or even to take age as a con­
tinuous variable. Instead, criteria must be worked out 
that constitute a connected generation in the sense of 
the constancy of a "historical social space" (Lepsius 
1973: 298ff, following Karl Mannheim's concept of a 
connected generation). According to the breadth with 
which one sees the concept of constancy of historical 
social space, one can arrive at a figure of 6 to 10 
generations for the Federal Republic (ibid.). Accord­
ing to the approach chosen here, three great age groups 
with broadly similar collective life experience will be 
distinguishable from each other analytically:
- the generation type that went through either the last 
or both World Wars and the Nazi dictatorship, and 
made the essential contribution to the reconstruction 





























































































them, this democratic order is seen as fundamentally 
positive, against the background of the dictatorship 
system of the Third Reich and political and economic 
collapse that they experienced in their lives. This 
group, now over 50, occupies the political and 
economic elite positions and therefore also has 
this interest as a reason to defend the existing 
system. One can distinguish from this generation:
the first post-war generation, not decisively in­
volved in reconstruction, with middle positions 
among the -social elite positions: while they tend on 
the whole to take a positive attitude towards the 
democratic system, they do not see themselves res­
ponsible for its legitimation;
the third generation type is formed of those age 
groups that went through their first socialization 
experiences after reconstruction in an economically 
and politically comparatively stable phase. For 
them, dictatorship, war and economic collapse do not 
constitute relevant experiences; they evaluate the 
existing order without having experienced in their 
lives these criteria for comparison, and instead 
orient themselves by democratic demands and the ex­
tent to which experienced democratic reality corres­





























































































ly drastic for third-generation representatives that 
have not yet managed to move up into social elite 
positions; they have therefore a tendency towards 
greater readiness to change the institutional system, 
in which they do not see themselves adequately me­
diated. For these age cohorts, the old lines of con­
flict are increasingly losing significance: the 
trend towards the "old centre" with simultaneous 
withdrawal movements along the anti-establishment/ 
New Politics dimension is clearly recognizable.
(FIGURE 4)
At the same time these groups clearly stand out from 
their inherited stratum position: they have less in 
common with the interests of their own social stratum 
than with those of their age cohort. It is the sons 
and daughters of the old middle class that are least 
mediated in the traditional conflict structure. They 
come out of their position in the political "old 
right camp" of businessmen and professionals, without, 
however, passing over into the "old left camp"; for 
them, the old conflict structure offers no alternative 
possibility of political orientation. But the corres­
ponding groups in the new middle class and the working 





























































































conflict dimension, are likewise open to party politi­
cal mediation of their specific interests. If now the 
position of a young "old middle class" and a young 
"new middle class" is compared with the corresponding 
generation types in the party space, then one can, on 
the basis of the well-known higher level of education
g
in the middle class , deduce the existence of an 
additional education effect. The suspicion that a 
status group is being formed here which is of above 
average qualifications by degree of education and 
political interest, and "frees itself from its coa­
lition with the petty bourgeoisie and becomes indepen­
dent" (Lepsius 1973: 310ff) because of its position of 
indifference as regards interests vis-à-vis the 
working class and the entrepreneurs, is clearly 
illustrated here. The New Politics dimension has its 
greatest importance —  and here, I feel, the voting 
potential of the FDP and that of the Greens becomes 
separated —  for that part of the younger generation 
which, while having the necessary prerequisites, has 
not (yet) managed to rise into social elite positions: 
the younger, well-educated generation, Kornhauser's 






























































































This interpretation leans strongly on individual life 
cycle effects to explain the preference for New 
Politics options. Spedifically, this would mean that 
each rising generation is initially open to New 
Politics approaches, and with increasing age and there­
fore growing professional and family responsibilities 
becomes more conservative, i.e. becomes integrated into 
the Old Politics. On this interpretation the conflict 
described will be characterized less by an opposition 
between an "old class" and a "new class" that is a 
permanent entity with distinct post-materialistic values 
(Inglehart 1981, Bruce-Briggs 1979), but more accurately 
as the problem already described in Pareto and Mosca of 
accommodating rising social elites. In fact both effects 
are linked with each other, to the extent that the con­
sequences of social modernization sharpen the problem 
of elite circulation both qualitatively and quantita­
tively.
In order to arrive at forecasts of the further course 
of this conflict dimension, it is necessary to investi­
gate individual life cycle effects in different 
generations, thereby separating the two effects. This 
problem does not look soluble at present, both from 
the methodological point of view and for reasons of in­





























































































(Gleen 1977, Allerbeck/Hoog 1981). We are therefore 
compelled to deduce hypotheses as to the direction and 
strength of these effects on the basis of separate, 
individual states of affairs.
Earlier work on value shifts in post-industrial 
societies have —  including for the case of the 
Federal Republic —  stressed the existence of strong 
generational effects (Inglehart 1971, Hildebrandt/Dal- 
ton 1977). According to this, younger generations show 
an increasingly strong interest for the New Politics, 
while the war and post-war generations continue to 
stick to the Old Politics. The development of these 
trends for the Federal Republic can be seen in Table 2, 
which shows the mean values for the New Politics 
dimension for a given generation at different points in 
time.
(TABLE 2)
Both the differences of the mean values and the eta 
coefficients of the variance analysis show the develop­
ment towards increasing importance of the generation 
effect for the New Politics dimension. These findings 
do not however allow any conclusions to be drawn as to 
the numerical change in the New Politics camp in any 





























































































for an even approximate determination of life cycle 
effects, such as Allerbeck and Hoog (1981) attempted. 
They managed to show that while the generation effect 
seems to be the best explanation for the shift in 
political attitudes, changes in individual life cycle 
—  predominantly at the age of around 30 —  also seem 
to be bound up with a change in political attitudes; 
however, a general connection between the process of 
ageing and a development towards conservatism has 
hitherto not been established.
On this background, the results in Fig. 5 could be 
interpreted either as a problem of elite circulation 
or as a conflict between "old" and "new" class.
In this situation the political system's capacity for 
integration, i.e. the ability of the political parties 
to tie in these new groups and their demands, takes on 
central importance. To the extent that integrative 
capacity declines, the chance increases that competing, 
new elites can on the basis of the social mobilization 
process appeal to various parts of the population with 
alternative programmes of solutions.
Voting Green as a reaction to a deterioration in system 
performance: the institutional analysis
In the foregoing section we have discussed the causes 





























































































patterns resulting from the development towards post­
industrial forms of society, and the consequences of 
these for the capacity of the political system or of 
the parties oriented round the old conflicts to take 
account of new or highly differentiated interests.
In this we have found that the integrative capacity of 
the German party system, its ability to integrate 
specific interests satisfactorily, is felt to be less 
than adequate in the estimation of certain population 
groups.
With this definition of the integrative capacity of a 
political system, starting from the individual's per­
ception of its efficiency, the further institutional 
analysis is delineated: it is not the formal structures 
of political institutions, and their system property 
designated as "value-considering potential", that is to 
be analysed here, but the capacity that the individual 
ascribes to political institutions for representing 
his own interests. It is only in this way that it be­
comes possible to explain the evident difference in the 
integrative capacity of the formally and institutional­
ly unchanged German party system between 1972 and 1980. 
These differences indicate that alongside the structural 
immobilism sketched out at the beginning in giving con­
sideration to new values, there is a decisive function 





























































































elite, the "translation handling" (Sartori 1968: 19).
On this viewpoint, the decreasing importance of class 
conflict could be explained by the fact that the 
political elite interprets this conflict politically 
with decreasing intensity. The increased weight given 
to the New Politics by the younger generations would 
then be explainable as a reaction to the development 
of the CDU and SPD into mass parties of the "people's 
party" type. While in the traditional setup the 
programmatically left camp, working for changes in the 
status quo, is symbolically integrated into the left 
class party via the interpretation of this conflict of 
interest as class conflict, with decreasing politici­
zation of this conflict the ideological integrative 
capacity of the former class party declines. Old left 
positions must be organized and legitimized at an in­
creasing remove from the traditional conflict structure.
Transferring this type of explanation to the develop­
ment of the German party system, we may draw the con­
clusion that the old left which was socialized until, 
say, the time of the SPD's Godesberg programme (1959-tr.) 
ought to differ from the up-and-coming left on both the 
Old and the New Politics dimensions. To test this hypo­





























































































socialization was calculated separately according to 
individual self-assessment on a left-right scale along 
both dimensions. The results, in Figure 6, confirm our 
hypothesis.
For the generations that had their primary socializa­
tion before 1945 and immediately after the end of the 
Second World War, the political position on the left- 
right continuum agrees almost perfectly with the 
traditionally embodied conflict structure . They de­
fine their political position through the ordering 
criteria derived from class conflict, i.e. from the 
Old Politics.
(FIGURE 6)
With different political socialization experiences, 
this pattern increasingly breaks up, especially on the 
left of the spectrum. Those who had their first poli­
tical experiences at the time when the SPD began to 
open into a people's party connect their left-wing 
positions increasingly with an "anti-establishment" 
pattern of interpretation separated from traditional 
class conflicts. Finally, for the youngest age cohorts 
of those now between 18 and 24, the old conflict has 





























































































logical "world-view" seen by the majority as left- 
wing. A key position in this interpretation is taken 
up by the age cohort that experienced its primary 
political socialization between 1966 and 1970 in the 
reideologization phase of German politics. For this 
group, the traditional class conflict has almost as 
great importance as for the oldest generation. At the 
same time, however, those on the left of this age 
cohort see themselves as just as far removed from the 
establishment as those on the left of the youngest 
group. It is here that there arises a political camp 
that is open to appeals for a reformist politics 
opposed to the establishment: the New Left.
From the fact that the New Politics does not always 
separate the whole generation equally, but that this 
conflict leads mainly to a separation between Old and 
New left, it can in accordance with our central thesis 
be concluded that the decline in ideological ties to 
the system of established conflict structures consti­
tutes a major cause for the development of the New
„ . . , . . 10 Politics dimension
Irrespective of whether the increased New Politics 
orientation of the younger generation is explained 
by their changing value priorities on the basis of




























































































greater individual or social welfare, or, as attempted 
here, as a function of the mode of political inter­
pretation of social conflicts by the political élite, 
both causes bring about in the first place a deterior­
ation in the integrative capacity of the political 
system.
Without strictly maintaining in the analysis below the 
differentiation outlined above of the causes of de­
clining integrative capacity, let us briefly go into 
the theoretical connection between the migratory move­
ment of some population groups out of the party system 
and the perceived effectiveness of the parties.
The question of the reaction of the members of an 
organization to its deteriorating performance was 
taken by Albert 0. Hirschman as the subject of his 
book Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970). For any member 
of an organization —  and the "psychological member­
ship" in parties mediated through party Loyalties can 
be included here —  there are, according to Hirschman, 
two contradictory reactions to a decline in the organi­
zation's performance: exit or voice. Transferred to 
party systems, this means voting for another party or 
articulating unsatisfied interests with the goal of 
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exit or voice, though, especially in the context of 
organizations with voluntary membership and political 
parties, are not taken abruptly, but on the basis of 
existing loyalties, i.e. positive ties, to those 
organizations. The greater the loyalty, the more 
likely will a person be to react to a deterioration 
in performance by voice rather than exit. Strong 
loyalties, not only to individual parties but also 
to groups in the social structure or to communities, 
increase voice because they make exit more diffi­
cult.
The conditions for the success of a —  green or al­
ternative -- new party are thereby adequately described. 
It has good chances with all voters who because of 
slight social or ideological ties to the existing 
social and political system have only slight loyalties 
to party and social systems and therefore have a 
rather low exit threshold. This threshold is lowest for 
people who have hitherto not developed any very strong 
positive attitude to any party. Should these groups in 
addition have no social position at stake, or should 
they evaluate the economic and social risks of alterna­
tive policy programmes with no basis of personal ex­
perience of economic collapse, then they are still 





























































































parties. But even in a voter group that either has 
other party loyalties and/or has already risen into 
established social positions, voting for an environ­
ment party is conceivable on the logic of exit or 
voice. Among the possibilities are firstly, because 
the deterioration in performance, for instance through 
environmental pollution, has reached such a pitch that 
material interests take second place by comparison.
Such situations, where threats to the environment 
become relatively dominant, arise where people are 
directly affected by the cost to prosperity of environ­
ment pollution. Secondly, people might vote Green des­
pite existing loyalties on the basis of a calculation 
that voting Green would stimulate or accelerate changes 
of course within the party. This drastic form of 
opposition by temporary exit becomes especially likely 
where the party previously voted for does not treat 
interest articulation within the party sufficiently 
flexibly, or else gives the impression that voice will 
not lead to any successful change of course. Temporary 
exit in this circumstance is easier where the risk 
for the party, to which a loyalty, however weak, per­
sists, remains calculable, or the consequences of a 
lost election would have no immediately negative results 
for the personal situation. Such a calculation might ex­
plain why the Greens clearly do worse in Bundestag 





























































































the perception of the voters, than in Landtag or 
municipal elections. Finally, a third medium-term de­
velopment might be that the Greens, through their 
participation in parliament, successfully minimize the 
perceived risk for established voter groups and there­
fore become votable on the basis of politically in­
adequately represented but socio-economically relevant 
interests.
Nevertheless all these movements towards exit are 
founded on the same basic pattern: the reduced capacity 
of the political system to mediate political conflicts 
arising either from divergent political interest prio­
rities or open conflict over adequate programmes to 
solve pressing environment problems.
To determine these effects and their interactions 
analytically, a path analysis was carried out with the 
variables generation, education, materialist or non­
materialist interest orientation, attitude to the ex­
pansion of nuclear energy, the establishment/anties- 
tablishment dimension as operationalization of ties to 
the political system, voting intentions and the actual 
(simulated) election of an environment party^. The 
results can be seen in figure 7; they represent a 






























































































The basis for the emergence of Green or alternative 
voter potential is changes in the social stratifi­
cation structure as mediated through a general rise 
in levels of education and a differentiation on that 
basis of socially organized interests. In the pro­
cesses of traditional interest mediation, the group 
of the better-educated younger generation is least 
involved. Their specific interests come up against a 
party system which is structurally less and less able 
adequately to reflect these interests. In particular, 
the younger generation's higher interest in non­
material values, such as participation in democratic 
decision-making processes, as well as the resistance 
mediated through the new interests against the growth- 
oriented consumer society —  and here opposition to 
nuclear energy is an exemplary case —  lead to a si­
tuation where these parts of the population feel them­
selves increasingly far removed from the system of so­
cial and political interest mediation organized prima­
rily according to old interest positions. The exit 
movement on the anti-establishment dimension is best 
explained by these two factors, and less simply by the 
effect of belonging to the younger generation; and 





























































































voting intention. The "crossing" of the threshold out 
of the system of the established political parties, 
expressed in an actual vote for the Greens, comes 
about by the addition of the intervening variables; 
mere membership in the younger generation or in the 
group of persons with higher education contributes 
nothing towards raising the voting tendency. The 
connection does not become visible until the inter­
action effect between high education and membership 
in the younger generation is included in the regres­
sion estimate. This shows what was already visible in 
Figure 5: the tendency to vote for an environment 
party rises exponentially in the young, better 
educated age cohort; the highly-educated welfare ge­
neration is leaving the established party system. The 
direct age and education effects of the other popula­
tion groups on voting decisions for the Greens dis­
appear completely here. This means that the voting 
intentions of these groups can essentially be ex­
plained by their low integration into the political 
system. The clearest effects here result from the des­
cribed disassociation movement on the anti-establish­
ment dimension, a directly and indirectly mediated 
anti-nuclear attitude and a non-material interest po­
sition. It is, finally, noteworthy that the education 
effects essentially act indirectly on the voting de­





























































































priorities —  and it is only through the unsatisfact­
ory mediation of these interests in the political 
system that the educationally conditioned exit moment 
is set going.
Prospects
On the basis of the connections outlined, the integra­
tive imagination of the established parties is stimul­
ated: either they show their adaptability by developing 
new ways to take account of even unorganized interests 
and potentials for opposition, or they are overwhelmed 
by an exit wave that can lead to a perceptible re­
arrangement of the relations between social groups and 
party systems. Certainly, any dramatization of the 
"deficitary party representation" described (Guggen- 
berger 1980: 14) would be out of place here: the exit 
potentials are still so small that the established 
parties cannot be sufficiently weakened that they can 
no longer recover.
In looking for a forecast of the Greens' future 
chances on the basis of the above analysis, several 
scenarios offer themselves, which can be distinguished 
according to the cause supposed for the emergence of 





























































































If the New Politics represents merely a problem of 
accommodating up-and-coming elites, then the con­
flict, which would be seen as exaggerated from an 
ideological point of view, could be solved as be­
fore with the establishment of the successive new 
elites. This scenario is, however, not very likely 
on the basis of our analysis.
If the New Politics is a consequence of rising 
social or individual prosperity, then we can count 
—  on the assumption of stable or at least not 
drastically deteriorating economic conditions —  on 
a further, constant increase in this conflict po­
tential. The established parties have on this view 
paradoxically contributed to this development through 
their efficiency, and are, qua mass integration 
parties, almost helpless in face of it. They would 
have to respond with a far-reaching "democratization" 
of politics.
Finally, it may be hypothesized that the trend to­
wards the "People's Party" is the cause of the shift 
towards the New Politics. This development would 
then primarily affect the SPD, since in the percept­
ion of voters and in its own claims, both in the 
"class struggle phase" in opposition and in the re- 





























































































policy of change, of social reform. This zeal for 
reform has flagged in the meantime, and the New 
Left —  and not only they -- have moreover lost in 
the transition from Brandt to Schmidt their charis­
matic leadership personality. Perhaps the shift to 
the New Politics should be seen much more than hi­
therto —  and this should be taken as an indication 
of a possible fourth scenario —  as a political 































































































1) Cf. on this the widely varied forecasts collected 
by F. Muller, in: Murphy et al. (1979); likewise 
R.-O. Schultze (1980).
2) A discussion of these theoretical assumptions can 
be found in Lehner (1979b). He points out that 
Inglehart's theory is confronted with a consistency 
problem that has its cause in the fact that it is 
based on two mutually independent approaches —  
Maslow's conception of a hierarchy of needs and a 
socialization thesis —  and that from the two 
approaches contradictory hypotheses regarding the 
individual value shift can be deduced. This con­
sistency problem seems especially problematic where 
the need priorities dependent on the individual 
level of material welfare are interpreted as value 
priorities on the assumption of long-term sociali­
zation processes.
3) The connection between level of prosperity, costs 
of prosperity and the articulation of environmental 
interests can, however, not be interpreted mono- 
causally and linearly. It should instead be assumed 





























































































conditions. First, for instance, the various ana­
lyses of the environmental protection movement 
indicate that there are clear interaction effects 
between university or big-city ambience and the 
articulation of protest. Objective detriment to 
the environment becomes relevant for political 
action only once it is interpreted politically by 
organized groups in the environment area. See on 
this also Pappi (1977) and Kaase/Klingemann (1979).
4) On this arrangement of the opposing camps see most 
recently Dalton (1981). I too should like to use
the term "new left" here, though without however over­
looking the problems that arise from the fact that 
in the German context this term is loaded with the 
connotations of the 60's New Left.
5) It might be objected to the restriction chosen that 
it means that in terns of statistical procedures
the dimensionality of the party system is inadequate­
ly grasped by it. On the other hand, various studies, 
e.g. Norpoth (1979), indicate that the individual 
rank order of the smaller parties in the German 
party system leads to very unstable and logically 
inconsistent preference orders, and furthermore that 
these rank orders are very strongly influenced by 
the party leaderships' coalition behaviour. From




























































































this aspect it would even seem defensible to leave 
the FDP too out of the analysis, since its sympathy 
values are unambiguously determined by the coalition 
with the SPD.
6) To sift the individual answer patterns —  arising 
from the fact that many of those questioned use only 
part of the scales to rate all the parties —  the 
individual average over all (4) ratings is calcul­
ated and subtracted from each rating. On this cf. 
Pappi (1973) and Barnes/Kaase (1979).
7) This possibility of calculating the principal compo­
nent values for each individual questioned is the 
main reason for choosing a factor analytic solution 
to the problem, despite ordinal scale quality. To 
determine the position of the groups in figures 4-6, 
in each case the group mean values were calculated 
on both dimensions and then transferred into the 
coordinate system. To delimit the stratum divisions, 
the head of household's occupation was used. On 
this cf. Pappi (1973: 193ff.).
8) In fact, in the group division made here too, the 
proportions of people with higher education in the 





























































































persons in the young "old middle class" in our ran­
dom sample, eight of those questioned were indeed 
still students; this also explains the "runaway" 
appearance of the group mean value.
9) In this connection cf. also the international com­
parative analysis by Kaase and Klingemann (1979).
The authors use a similar group sub-division, but 
in addition distinguish according to the extent of 
church ties of these groups and can therefore 
demonstrate a further "unattachment" effect in the 
sense of the theory presented here.
10) In favour of this interpretation there is also the 
fact found by Inglehart (1977) that on a European 
comparison the New Left is below average in strength 
in British politics, which is strongly character­
ized by class conflict. In these aspects one should 
expect French politics to show a drastic reduction 
in the voting share of the écologistes on the back­
ground of the wave of reforms set going by Mitterand
11) An exhaustive description of the individual variable 
can be found in the appendix. Figure 7 shows the net 
work of interactions between the variables arranged 
causally in the direction of each arrow. Nonsignifi­
cant effects have not been entered. The strength of 
the significant effects is expressed by the standard 
ized regression coefficients (beta weightings) 






























































































Generation Dichotomized for the regression
analysis into the youngest post-
war generation 18-29 years (1),
30 years and older (0)
Education Dichotomized for the regression
analysis into Abitur (approx A
levels) and above (1), and below
(0)
Postmaterialist Interest Rank ordering of the 4 Inglehart
Position items:
- maintenance of law and order
in this country
- more influence of citizens on
governmental decisions
- fight against rising prices
- protection of the right to
freedom of speech
Dichotomization: second and
fourth items mentioned in first
and second places = postmater-
ialist ideal type (1), other
combinations (0)
Establishment/Anti- Factor score on the basis of
Establishment sympathy ratings of the politi-
cal parties CDU, SPD, FDP and
Greens, with individual ans-
wering patterns sifted
Green Voting Intentions Could you imagine that you
would vote for this party (pre-





























































































environment party) in a 
Bundestag election, or do you 
not think so? Dichotomy: yes 
(1) , no (0)
Elections of Greens Here is a ballot paper giving
the names of parties. Please 
put one cross secretly against 
the party that you would now 
vote for in a Bundestag 
election. Dichotomy: Greens 
(1), other (0)
Anti-nuclear Nuclear energy should be
further developed to meet our 
future energy needs. Dichotomy: 
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Old and New Conflict Dimension and Political Camp
ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT
(Preference for 
unconventional forms of 
participation)






































































































































































































Sympathy ratings of political parties, 1980




SPD 2.42 2.58 1.9 0.6
CDU 1.72 2.33 2.1 0.6
FDP 1.52 2.16 2.6 0.6
GREENS -0.93 2.62 6.1 1.7
Note : x = mean value; s = standard deviation —  on scale 
from -5 through 0 to +5.
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